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Abstract
This paper utilizes the data generated from Television game shows The Weakest
Link to study real life strategic voting with large stake payoffs. Theoretical models are
built to analyze the three-player voting possibly with second move of tie breaker. With
reasonable specifications, equilibria can be constructed to support all observed out-
comes. When the game structure is relatively simple with single possible tie breaker,
the empirical results are in line with theoretical implications. When the tie breaker
is uncertain, the predictability of basic game theory analysis is largely compromised.
Regression results suggest that, with presence of increased complexity and uncertainty
in the voting game, naive coordination strategies are instead adapted. Strategic un-
truthful performance is found as a source of inaccurate prediction of theory.
Keywords: The Weakest Link, Strategic voting, Strategic uncertainty, experi-
mental game theory.
Acknowledgment: This thesis would not be possible without support from my
supervisors, Kunal Sengupta and Hajime Katayama. I am deeply grateful to their
constructive suggestions, patient guidance, and continuous encouragement. I sincerely
appreciate their emails and calls took places at nights and during weekend. I also
thank Steven Levitt and Peter Arcidiacono for their provisions of data sets.
1
1 Introduction
Though Reinhard Selten, one of laureates who shared the Nobel prize in Economics 1994,
stated that “Game theory is for proving theorems, not for playing games.”, regarding game
theory as normative theory about what rational players would do, rather than a positive
theory about facts. Works on testing and advancing game theory as a predicting tool
has been numerous. Game theory as a decision theory in social science is expected to
have close reality relevance with human behavior and is demanded to be applicable in a
considerable level of precision. However, due to the complexity of real life situation, the
study of applicability of game theory as a predicting tool in the real life is largely constrained.
The burgeoning experimental methodology in game theory exploits the advantages of exact
control and discretionary design of games as in laboratory environment. However, due to
the limiting financial resources available for the experimental studies, stakes and payoff
levels in this class of study are normally small. As in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), under
uncertainty, decision making is rather reference point dependent. Payoffs are related to
agents’ initial positions when decisions are to be made. Also, by calibrating risk-aversion
magnitudes when stakes are small and moderately large in an expected utility framework,
Rabin (2000) showed, the conventional practices of the expected utility theory could lead
to absurd results. On the ground that essentially all decision makings are associated with
uncertainty, the stake sizes in a game could have significant influence on how people actually
play games.
The Weakest Link is a series of Television game shows providing nice sources for study
in people’s strategic behavior in real life situation with large stake rewards. In such quiz-
like game shows with strategic voting, the rules are well familiar to the contestants and
the incentive of strategic playing is strong, particularly in the final voting round that three
contestants are left, given that only one contestant can be rewarded to the final prize after
all. Beside large stakes involvement, TV game shows as natural experimental study for game
theory also has the advantage that the participants are generated from a wider, hence more
representative, population, unlike many experimental studies conducted around educational
and research institutes and subjects pools are limited to some narrower groups such as
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college students.
This paper focuses on the last voting round in which three players vote to decide which
two are going to stay and compete for the final prize. At this stage, information for decision
making is available to certain amount and incentive for strategic voting is at its summit.
Theoretical models with various specifications on information symmetry, possible revenge
motive and tie breaker identity, are built to analyze the voting behavior. Although all three
possible voting outcomes in such voting are observed with significant proportions in the data,
only the outcome of eliminating the strongest player universally exists in all theoretical
specifications. Outcomes such as eliminating the weakest player can be only supported
by equilibria in particular specifications with restrictions. In particular, in the simplest
specification when information is symmetric and players are free from revenge motive in
voting, eliminating the strongest player is the only outcome survives Iterative Elimination
of Weakly Dominated Strategy. It is found that the predictions of theoretical models are
relatively well when the game is relatively simple and involves less uncertainty. When a
larger level of uncertainty complicates the game, players tend to utilize native coordinating
strategy so that sophisticated equilibrium analyze loses its power of prediction. A moderate
level of strategic pretence is also found, which is attributed as a source of uncertainty that
compromises the effectiveness of expected utility maximizing play.
This paper proceeds as following. Next subsection provides a brief survey on related
literature. Section two introduces the TV game shows The Weakest Link and provides basic
observations and summary statistics on the data sets. Section three constructs theoretical
models to analysis the interested three-person voting game. Section four provides empirical
evidence on how individuals shape their voting decisions, what factors affect the voting
outcome, and a discussion on the discrepancy between theoretical and empirical results.
Section five concludes.
1.1 Related literature
There have been several papers studying TV game shows to pursue economic understand-
ing. By studying TV shows “The Price is Right”, Bennett and Hickman (1993) and Berk,
Hughson and Vandezande (1996), documented the existence of sub-optimal behavior and im-
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provement of strategic effectiveness through learning respectively. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna
(2006) tested loss-aversion using the data from the TV shows “Affari Tuoi”. Bertner (1993),
Metrick (1995), and Beetsma and Schotman (2001) focused on the revealed risk preference
as in TV shows “Card Sharks”, “Jeopardy” and “Lingo”. With U.S. version of The Weakest
Link, discrimination is studied by Levitt (2004) and Antonovics, Arcidiancono and Walsh
(2005) independently; With data from the British version, Haan et. al (2003) studied the
sub-optimal strategy on the so-called banking decisions in the process on cooperative prize
money accumulation; Pogrebna (2006) studies the pure strategy Nash plays in all but last
round and the mixed strategy in the last voting round. Overconfidence bias and prevalence
of proper mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was inferred by posited equilibrium play and
successful coordination over multiple equilibria in the last voting round. Fe´vriera and Lin-
nemerb (2006) also studied the three-person voting with data generated from French version
of The Weakest Link. Risk dominance and Payoff dominance criteria for equilibrium selec-
tion in a coordination game was assessed by modeling the voting as a two-signal one-shot
game. However, they failed to generalize with the three-signal situation, which accounts for
a major proportion in our data set collected by Levitt (2004). More importantly, their basic
assumption regarding current round performance as signals is at odd with our larger data
set.
There is a large set of experimental literature on whether and how well individual plays
equilibrium, subject to refinement criteria if applicable. The conclusions critically depend
on the structure of the games. Laboratory results in Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta
(2001) illustrated that in the simple one-shot 3 × 2 normal form games, which have com-
plete information and were dominant solvable, around 90% of time players managed to play
dominant strategy immediately available, 60% of time players succeeded to play the dom-
inant strategy after one round’s elimination of dominated strategy by other’s, and figure
decreased to 20% if dominant strategy stands out after two rounds of iterative deletions
of dominated strategy. In Stahl and Wilson (1994), 60% of time responses in the 3 × 3
symmetric normal form games with unique pure strategy equilibrium complied with Nash
equilibrium prediction. In the games with similar structures but unique mixed strategy
equilibrium, the observed distribution of actions differs from the mixed equilibrium implied
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distribution at 5% level of significance. The Nash prediction however is quite poor when
it comes to the class of games known as “beauty contest”, special those gave zero equilib-
rium value according to backward deduction. A “beauty contest” game is for example a
game of two players simultaneously choosing a number between 0 and 100. The one who
chose the number closest to 2/3 of the average wins a fixed prize. Backward deduction
would predict a unique corner solution that zero is chosen by both in equilibrium. However,
laboratory results summarized by Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) indicated that observed
actions substantially deviated from the predicted value. In the same paper, it was shown
that games with higher stake in general had closer distance between observed and predicted
outcome, indicating a cost-benefit analysis for cognitive effort and confirming the signifi-
cance of large stake involvement in experimental study. In general, the more complicated
the game structure was, the less likely the players played as predicted by equilibrium.
In modeling the strategic voting of The Weakest Link in the last voting game in which
three players are left, the payoffs are uncertain. Although the payoff for the final winner is
approximately known, the outcome directly associated with the strategy voting is not. The
voting is to determine who is going to be eliminated from the game and which pair of players
is left to compete for the final prize. Since one can only estimate the probability of winning
when one competes against the other, payoffs are largely ranked and not precise. Given
that the subjective estimate of payoff is based on signals received by players, changes in the
strength of signals may have large impact on the strategic behavior. This is suggested by the
experimental results from Goeree and Holt (2001), in which it was shown that the payoff
structure could dramatically alter the observed outcome even if the unique equilibrium
or the unique equilibrium survived appropriate refinement concepts is unchanged. Also,
Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001) provided evidence that subject’s capability
to play simple equilibrium in the laboratory environment could be reduced moderately if
the payoffs were to be looked up by simple mouse clicking individually without time and
frequency constraint, instead of common practice of presenting all payoffs in a matrix within
a screen for straight forward comparison. Hence, it is interesting to see how well players
play equilibrium in such game with ranked payoffs.
Decisions in The Weakest Link were also subject to framing effect, as discussed in
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Fe´vriera and Linnemer (2006). The name of the TV game shows, The Weakest Link, implic-
itly pointed to the direction of voting against the weakest player. This suggestion, however,
may not be self-enforceable. Voting off a weak candidate means one is to be matched with
a strong contestant. It lowers one’s chance to gain the winner-take-all prize. Though, it is
plausible that matching with a stronger candidate could increase the money pool more in
the post-voting round, such gain may not large enough to compensate the drawback in low
winner chance. Brandts and MacLeod (1995) experimentally tested the stability of equilib-
rium with various concepts, when it is subject to recommended strategy. With present of
dominant strategy, players in their experiment did not player weakly dominated strategy,
regardless the recommendations. However, when there was strategic uncertainty, players did
not always follow the recommended strategy, even if it pointed to a Pareto-superior equi-
librium. Nevertheless, recommendation did help coordination sometime. Given that effect
of recommendation is indecisive and inconclusive in game with strategic uncertainty, I hope
that this paper would provide some insight on strategic behavior when implicit suggestion
presents.
2 The Weakest Link TV shows
2.1 Format and Rules
The data set used in this thesis was generated from the syndicated version of The Weakest
Link broadcasted by NBC in the U.S.A. It featured with six contestants at the beginning of a
game show. The game consisted of six rounds. Each of first four rounds was divided into two
phrases, prize accumulation phrase and voting phrase. In the prize accumulation phrase, the
contestants cooperated to build up the money pot for the final winner. They alternatively
gave answers to general quiz questions. A correct answer constructed a “link” in the “money
chain”, in which amount of money grown exponentially. Once a so-called Banking decision
was made, the amount of money in the money chain would be added to the money pot
reserved for the final winner and a new money chain would be constructed. Each contestant
had the chance to make Banking decision before s/he attempted the quiz question, simply
by saying “Bank”. However, an incorrect attempt destroyed the whole money chain and a
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new chain needed to be constructed from next attempt. Thus, the cooperation of building
up a high amount of prize for the final winner required correct attempts to the questions
and good timing of bank decisions.
After the prize accumulation phrase within a time frame, a voting phrase followed.
Each player remained in that round cast a vote to vote off a contestant. The one received
maximum votes would be eliminated from the game and got no monetary reward. In case
that more than one had maximum number of votes, a tie breaker rule applied. The one
who had maximum number of correct attempts in that round should be the tie breaker.
In case that this rule did not give unique identification, the one with minimum attempts,
among those who had maximum correct attempts, gained this tie-breaking privilege. If
the tie-breaker identity was still undetermined, it was resorted to the banking decisions, in
favor of the one who banked highest amount of money in total in that round. The last
resort was randomization. In the final voting round with three players left, the first two
criterions is equivalent to choosing the one with maximum correct rate, given that in the
data set, the maximum and minimum number of attempts were four and two respectively,
and they did not coexist in the same game. Such tie breaker was called the Strongest Link.
Correspondingly, the opposite player was called the Weakest Link. The Strongest Link
and Weakest Link identities were known to audience through an announcer’s narration.
However, contestant were not told of such identities explicitly, nor any statistics.
After four rounds of voting and elimination, two players were left in the game and
there was an additional round, round 5, for prize accumulation without voting. Money
accumulated in this round would be triple before being added into the money pool. After
this, the two players entered into the final head-to-head round to compete for the prize for
final winner. In this round, each player would be asked three questions in alternative fashion.
The Strongest Link from the last round, or second strongest link if the first strongest link was
eliminated, could choose between first move and second move. The one with more correct
attempts won. If winner did not come out within the three questions each, the fourth, fifth,
sixth question and so on would be asked until the one gave correct answer while the other
did not. The winner received all the money accumulated in the game and else received
nothing.
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The primary data set used in this thesis is the same data set used in Levitt (2004).
It contains 136 broadcasted episodes. Variables include the demographic characteristics of
each contestant, such as age, gender, occupation, race and geographic origin, numbers of
correct answers and total attempts in each round, the votes cast by players in each round
with voting, and who was the final winner. A supplementary data set is also used. This
is the data set used in Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh (2005) (AAW(2005) hereafter),
containing 75 episodes of syndicated version. The episodes in AAW(2005)’s data set are
mostly covered in the former one. But it contains additional variable recording what amount
of money was banked by each contestant in each round.
In AAW(2005)’s dataset, though the prize for the winner was capped at $75,000, this
ceiling was never reached. The average amount of money for the final winner is $8400, with
minimum, maximum and median at $2,750, $23,750 and $7,000. The average money pot
accumulated up to the voting phrase in round 4 (last voting round) is $7,323. The average
increment of money pot after all voting is $1,077.
2.2 Myopic or not?
To analyze the strategic behavior in the last voting round, the first question might be, to
what extent were players able to infer the strength, i.e. capability to give correct answers,
of her/his opponents from past performance, so that one can estimate the payoffs associated
with different outcomes. In Fe´vriera and Linnemer (2006), in which the French version of
The Weakest Link was studied, players were presumed to be myopic, i.e. have imperfect
recall on other contestants’ past performance. The conclusion that players can only recall
the performance of contestants’ current round performance was drawn by the multinomial
logit regressions. These regressions modeled the probability of a candidate being voted off
in a voting as a function of the candidate’s correct rates of attempts in each of current and
previous rounds, as well as the candidate’s age and gender. Fe´vriera and Linnemer (2006)
found that only current round performance significantly affect the voting behavior, except
in Round 3 where the correct rates in the previous rounds were also determining factor.
However, this is not the case with our regression results as we will discuss.
To examine whether players are myopic, it is better to model the individual voting
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decisions than the voting outcomes (i.e., which candidate was voted off). Assume that the
utility of voting against a particular candidate is a linear function of the covariates and the
error term follows a standard Type I extreme value distribution. This leads to the conditional
logit model; the probability of voter i voting against candidate j can be expressed as:
pij =
exp(xjα+ zjβ)∑n
k=1 exp(xkα+ zkβ)
(1)
where xj is a vector of candidate j’s correct rates in the current and past round(s), zj is a
vector of variables controlling for candidate j’s demographic characteristics such as education
level, occupation, age, gender, and race. For each round, equation (1) is estimated by the
maximum likelihood method.
Estimation results are reported in Table 1. From Round 1 to Round 3 all current and
past correct rates of candidates are significant at the one percent levels. This contrasts with
evidence provided by Fe´vriera and Linnemer (2006). In Round 4, unlike Round 1 to Round 3,
only current round correct rates are significant at the one percent level. To further examine
whether correct rates in previous rounds did not affect the individual voting decisions in
Round 4, the likelihood ratio test is conducted. The null hypothesis that all coefficients of
correct rates in previous rounds are zero is not rejected at 10% level of significance. However,
it is quite implausible that players suddenly cannot recollect the past performance when s/he
comes to Round 4. The insignificance of correct rates in previous rounds in Round 4 could
be due to the strategic behavior. Incentive to vote off the stronger candidate was strongest
in this final voting round, while the consideration of keeping strong contestants in game to
help accumulate prize pool could dominate in previous rounds. Also, since a single vote is
much less influential in previous rounds given a large number of voters, it is difficult for
players to coordinate to vote off a strong candidate even if they have strong incentive to
do so. Thus, the framing effect as in the TV show’s name “The Weakest Link” would have
heavily shaped the voting decisions.
The divergent conclusions between Fe´vriera and Linnemerb (2006) and this thesis can
be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, in the French version of The Weakest Link studied
by Fe´vriera and Linnemerb (2006), there are nine contestants at the first round and hence
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seven rounds of elimination in total. There are three more rounds than in the U.S. version.
So given in the same order of round, say Round 3, three more correct rates in each previous
round were to be recalled. Such increased requirement on working memory could lead to
imperfect recall for contestants in the French version. Secondly, the findings in Fe´vriera
and Linnemerb (2006) may be due to a small sample. Their dataset recorded 36 episodes
aired in France. Since they model the voting outcomes, only 36 observations were used for
each round-specific regression. The degree of freedom becomes even 26 as a consequence
of including 9 explanatory variables when they analyzed Round 7 voting. With this small
degree of freedom, it is hard to accurately estimate the effects of correct rates in previous
rounds. On the other hand, our conditional logit model utilizes 544 voting decisions from 136
episodes, giving 1632 voter-candidate cases. This makes it possible to have more accurate
estimates than those in Fe´vriera and Linnemerb (2006).
2.3 Performance index
With the assumption that players were capable of recalling others’ past performance, the fol-
lowing performance index formula in Pogrebna (2006) is applied to represent the individual
strength to give correct answers.
Sri =
∑r
k=1wkxik∑r
k=1wkyik
(2)
The above performance index is essentially a weighted average of correct rate of individual
i as in Round r. xik is the correct attempts of individual i in Round k. yik is the total
attempts of individual i in Round k. Weight for Round k performance is given by the
incorrect rate of all contestants in that round, denoted by wk. Therefore, this performance
index is able to capture players’ impression of strength of other contestants.
The calculated performance index up to the last voting in Round 4 then gives unique
identities for the three players who survive to this stage, except in two episodes1 For con-
venience of subsequent analysis, let “A”, “B”, and “C” denote the player with highest,
median and lowest performance index respectively. Table 2 gives summary statistics on this
1In each of these two episodes, there are two players with identical correct rates in each previous rounds.
In the subsequent regressions, the (ordinal) identities among these two players are randomly assigned.
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performance index as in the end of Round 4.
2.4 Voting results and tie breaker identity
In the last voting round of interest, three players cast their votes simultaneously. If they vote
randomly with equal probability, one would expect tie happens once in four voting games.2
The identity of tie breaker is critical to the structure of the voting game. In 82 episodes
out of 136 in Levitt’s dataset, tie breaker is determined by the primary criteria in the tie
breaker identification. That is, in 60% of time, a single player has the maximum correct rate
in Round 4. In the data set of Antonovics etc., it is rare that tie breaker identity remains
unsolved after consider the money banked by player in that round. However, it seems to
unrealistic to assume that contestants are able to remember the money banked by each
person. Banking decision needed to be made quickly before the host started a new question,
and the value of that answer and the amount of money in the chain was not explicitly stated
to the contestants. Unlike the correct rates of other contestants, banking decisions provided
little information about one’s probability of winning if a particular contestant would be
confronted in the final head-to-head3. Given the intense environment of the show scene,
it is assumed that when two or three contestants had equal maximum correct rates, the
assignment of tie breaker identity is perceived to be random to those who got maximum
correct rates. The Table 3 gives the distribution of tie breaker identity profile under this
assumption in Levitt’s data set. As shown in Table 4, the most likely cases are (1) where
tie breaker is player A for sure and (2) where tie breaker is player A or player B, presumed
to be with equal chance. The former accounts for 40% of time while the latter for 21%. The
distribution of voting outcomes in the whole data set (of Levitt) and in various tie breaker
identity profiles is presented in the Table 4. Each possible outcome is found to share a
significant portion. However, intuitively, one would expect that the strongest player, player
A, would have a high chance to be eliminated, which was not the case. In fact, player A
has the highest chance to stay, 74%, among all contestants. Since the above two tie breaker
situations account for the major share in the dataset, the following section analyzes these
2Two voting profiles in 23 = 8 possible voting profiles raise ties.
3A simple linear regression does not find any significant correlation of performance index with amount
of money banked, nor with number of banking decisions
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two situations theoretically.
3 Theoretical analysis
As shown in Table 4, when the tie beaker is known to be player A for sure, voting outcomes
of (A, B) match account for the largest proportion, 43%, while (B, C) matches account for
the smallest proportion, 23%. When tie breaker can be either player A or player B with
equal chance, (A, B) match remains the most likely outcome, accounting for 48%, though
(A, C) match now takes place of (B, C) match as the least likely outcome. The following
section first provides a baseline model to illustrate the intuitive results that only (B, C)
match should be formed. Then, more sophisticated theoretical models are constructed to
support the observation that all three outcomes accounts for significant proportions. In
particular, equilibria are characterized to supported to most dominant outcomes of (A, B)
match.
Suppose there are two types of players, High type (H) and Low type (L). High type
players are more capable to give correct answer for a quiz question than Low type players do.
Thus, when a High type player competes with a Low type player in the final head-to-head,
High type has a better chance to win. Let the probability of a High type beating a Low
type in the head-to-head to be α > 1/2. Assume that two players with the same type have
equal chance to win.
At the final voting round, let the three players left denoted by i, i = A,B,C. The
strength of player i is denoted by pi, the probability of player i being High type. As before,
player A is perceived to be the strongest player while player C is the weakest, so that
pA ≥ pB ≥ pC (3)
Let X be the prize money for the final winner, U(·) be the utility from the prize money
for the winner. Given that the prize pool increment in the post-voting round, Round 5, is
small, and the proportional increment should not be too sensitive to strengths of survived
contestants, we treat X as fixed at the time of voting. U(0) is normalized to zero. Therefore,
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the expected utility of a High type player to compete with a player with strength pj is
piH(pj) = [
1
2
pj + α(1− pj)]U(X) (4)
Similarly, the expected utility for Low type is
piL(pj) = [(1− α)pj + 1
2
(1− pj)]U(X) (5)
In this voting game, each player chooses to vote against one candidate out of two. In case
of tie that each player receives one vote, the tie breaker finalizes. Changing from initial vote
is allowed. Two cases are considered here. One is for those episodes there is only one player
scores maximum correct rate in the round and this unique tie breaker is player A, who is
perceived to be the strongest player according to the overall performance in the game. The
other is that two players, player A and player B, both score the maximum correct rate in
that round. And they are presumed to have equal chance to be revealed as tie breaker when
tie happens. The tie breaker situation is common knowledge to all players. Through out
the theoretical section, these two tie breaker identity situations are focused for their major
share in the data set. The three possible voting outcomes, given by the formation of (A,
C) match, (A, B) match and (B, C) match in the head-to-head round, are associated with
player B, C, A being eliminated respectively.
3.1 Symmetric information4
Assume that the strength distribution is common knowledge. No player has private infor-
mation regarding his/her own type. Then, player i’s expected utility when s/he competes
with player j is given by
pii(pj) = pipiH(pj) + (1− pi)piL(pj) (6)
4Proofs of propositions in this section are included in Appendix A.
13
3.1.1 Baseline models
In the baseline model, players are merely motivated by expected utility maximization. Given
that expected utility pii(pj) is a strictly decreasing function of opponent’s strength, pj, the
tie breaker will always choose to eliminate the stronger candidate.
Proposition 1: If tie breaker is player A for sure and pA > pB > pC , the only voting
outcome survives Iterative Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategy is that player A will
be voted off.
Proposition 2: If it is common knowledge that tie breaker is player A or player B with
equal chance and pA > pB > pC , the unique voting outcome survives Iterative Elimination
of Weakly Dominated Strategy is (B, C) match.
3.1.2 Vengeful tie breaker
Now suppose that tie breakers are all vengeful, i.e. in case of tie, the tie breaker will eliminate
the one who just voted against him/her, regardless the associated payoffs. A tie breaker or
potential tie breaker awards that s/he will revenge in a tie before s/he votes.
Proposition 3: If it is common knowledge that player A is tie breaker for sure, tie
breaker is vengeful, and pA > pB > pC , (B, C) match is the unique voting outcome survives
Iterative Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategy.
Proposition 4: If it is common knowledge that player A or player B is tie breaker with
equal chance, tie breaker is vengeful, and piC(pB) ≥ 2piC(pA), (B, C) match is the unique
voting outcome survives Iterative Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategy.
Proposition 5: If it is common knowledge that player A or player B is tie breaker with
equal chance, and tie breaker is vengeful, and the following conditions are satisfied:
piC(pB) < 2piC(pA) (7)
pA ≥ pB > pC (8)
(A, C) match and (B, C) match can be supported by pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6: If it is common knowledge that player A or player B is tie breaker with
equal chance, tie breaker is vengeful, and piC(pB) < 2piC(pA), (A, B) match can be supported
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by mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Thus, (A, C) match and (A, B) match can be only supported by equilibrium when
(1) tie breaker is uncertain; (2) all tie breakers are presumed to be vengeful; and (3) the
strength profile of the three players satisfies certain condition. In other cases, eliminating
player A is the unique outcome. In Proposition 5 & 6, piC(pB) < 2piC(pA), is solved to be
(α − 1
2
)(2pA − pB − pC) < 12 . Thus, higher strengths of player B and player C, and lower
strength of player A are in favor of the existence of (A, C) match and (A, B) match in
the above specifications. Given that (A, B) match is still the most likely outcome when
tie breaker is player A for sure, the following subsection turns to analysis on asymmetric
information for less restrictive results.
3.2 Asymmetric information5
In this subsection, asymmetric information is introduced and revenge motive is placed in a
more general setting. In the previous subsection, players are assumed to be vengeful with
probability 0 or 1. Here, suppose there are two types of tie breaker, Vengeful and Non-
vengeful. As before, Vengeful players in a tie will switch his/her initial vote to eliminate
the player who just voted against him/her, while Non-vengeful players are only interested
in maximizing expected utility from prize money. However, vengeful players recognize such
emotional constraint imposed by themselves, and maximize expected utility subject to con-
straints. Suppose that the prior belief of play i being Vengeful type is γi ∈ (0, 1), which is
a non-increasing function of the strength ratio pB/pC for player i = A and strength ratio
pA/pC for player i = B. This specification captures the fact that the higher is the strength
ratio of the two candidates, the higher is the expected utility difference from matching with
one versus the other. And higher cost of this non-strategic behavior reduces one’s incline to
revenge. Of cause this includes the special case that γ is just a constant. Let γi to be com-
mon knowledge. While strength distribution pi, i = A,B,C., remains common knowledge,
players now know their own type, both strength type and Vengeful-or-not type. Suppose
one’s strength type is distributed independent on his/her tie breaker tie. Firstly, Proposition
7-10 characterize results when revenge motive is absent, i.e. γi is restricted to be zero for
5Proofs of propositions in this section are included in Appendix B.
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i = A,B.
Proposition 7: If tie breaker is player A for sure and revenge motive is absent, there
are pooling sequential equilibria supporting (A, C) match and (B, C) match.
Proposition 8: If tie breaker is player A for sure and revenge motive is absent, there
is no pure strategy sequential equilibrium (A, B) match.
Proposition 9: If tie breaker is player A or player B with equal chance, revenge motive
is absent, there are pure strategy sequential equilibria supporting (A, C) match and (B, C)
match6.
Proposition 10: If tie breaker is player A or player B with equal chance, revenge motive
is absent, there is mixed strategy sequential equilibria supporting (A, B) match.
Then, more general results with γi ∈ (0, 1) are presented in Proposition 11-14.
Proposition 11: If tie breaker is player A for sure, there are pooling Sequential equi-
libria supporting (A, C) match and (B, C) match.
Proposition 12: If tie breaker is player A for sure, and γApiL(pA) ≥ (1− pC)piL(0), the
following strategy profile is a sequential equilibrium supporting (A, C) match and (A, B)
match7:
1. Non-vengeful player A votes against player B; Vengeful player A votes against player
C;
2. Both types of player B votes against player C;
3. High type player C votes against player B; Low type player C votes against player A;
4. when tie A→ B → C → A 8 happens, player A chooses to go with player C;
6It is possible to construct a mixed strategic equilibrium such that (1) player A, regardless of type, is
indifferent between voting against either candidate, and hence randomizes; (2) Low type of player B and
player C play proper mixed strategy; (3) High type of player B and player C vote against each other. Such
mixed strategy equilibrium supports all three possible outcomes. However, it is believed that players are
not able to carry out such delicated calculation of mixed strategy, exspecially time allowed for casting vote
is tight in the show scene.
7Similar as before, given restriction on parameters, it is possible to construct a mixed strategic equilibrium
such that (1) player A of non-vengeful tie, regardless of strength types, votes against player B; (2) player
A of vengeful type, regardless of strength types, is indifferent between voting against either candidate, and
hence randomizes; (3) Low type of player B and player C play proper mixed strategy; (4) High type of
player B and player C vote against each other. Such mixed strategy equilibrium supports all three possible
outcomes. However, it is believed that players are not able to carry out such delicated calculation of mixed
strategy, exspecially time allowed for casting vote is tight in the show scene.
8i→ j indicates that player i votes against player j
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5. The associated equilibrium belief is that player C is of Low type, and player B with
probability pB is High type.
6. The off equilibrium belief of player A in tie A → C → B → A is that player C is of
High type, and player B’s type is unrestricted.
The condition piL(pA) ≥ (1− pC)piL(0) seems to be quite restrictive. However, if mixed
strategy is allowed for player C, this condition can be relaxed a bit. As long as High type and
Low type player C plays mixed strategy in such a way that, conditional on voting against
player B, player C’s probability of being High type is higher than that of player B ex ante
(pB), other two players will not deviate. Player C remains indifferent since s/he will be still
matched to non-vengeful player A. For example, let High type C votes against player B, Low
type C vote against player A with probability qC/(1−pC), against player B with probability
1− qC
1−pC . So that conditional on voting against player B, the probability of player C being
High type is pC/(1 − qC). Let pC1−qC = pB + , for some  > 0. Thus, qC =
pB−pC+
pB+
and
γApiL(pA) ≥ qCpiL(0) is required for this equilibrium to exist. In fact, as  converges to zero,
it gives the necessary condition for this equilibrium:
γApiL(pA) >
pB − pC
pB
piL(0) (9)
By looking at the both sides of the above inequality, weakness of player A and player B,
and strength of player C would be in favour of the existence of such equilibrium supporting
both (A, C) match and (A, B) match.
Proposition 13: Given tie breaker is player A or player B with equal chance, (B, C)
match can be supported by pooling sequential equilibrium; (A, C) match can be supported
by pooling sequential equilibrium if piL(pA) ≥ γBpiL(pB).
Proposition 14: Given tie breaker is player A and player B with equal chance, and
(α − 1
2
)(2pA + 2pB − 3pC) ≤ 12 , (A, B) match can be supported by sequential equilibrium
with strategy profile that both player A and player B vote against player C, and both types
of player C randomize in the same way.
In this equilibrium, one would expect that the higher strength of player A or player B
is, the less likely the above condition is satisfied and hence the less likely (A,B) match is
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observed. In contrast, the higher strength of player C implies higher likelihood for (A, B)
match, given all else constant.
In sum, in both symmetric and asymmetric information setting, the theory predicts
that (B, C) should always exist in both tie breaker situations. Moreover, in symmetric
information setting, if breaker is known to be player A, (B, C) match is the only possible
outcome. If tie breaker is player A or player B with equal chance, the theoretical setting
with symmetric information but no revenge motive still predicts (B, C) match to be the
unique outcome. While tie breaker is either player A or player B with equal chance, and
revenge motive is presumed and dominates in the tie breaking decisions, (A, C) match
and (B, C) match can be supported by pure strategy equilibrium if certain conditions are
satisfied. Weaker strongest player, player A, and stronger weak players, player B and C,
are in favor of the existence of these two voting outcomes. (A, B) match can be supported
by mixed strategy equilibrium, in which player C randomizes. In asymmetric information
setting, while tie breaker is player A for sure, (A, C) match, in addition to (B, C) match,
is supported by equilibrium without much restriction. Existence of (A, B) match requires
that player A is not too strong and player C is not too weak. The strength of player B
may affect the existence condition through its affect on the probability of player A being
vengeful. While tie breaker is either player A or player B with equal chance, for (A, C)
match to be supported by equilibrium, it needs strength difference of player A and player
B to be small enough9 . Player C’s strength may affect the existence condition through its
impact on the probability of player B being vengeful. (A, B) match’s existence also requires
that player C’s strength is not too far behind from player A and player B.
In spite of the universal existence of (B, C) match, (B, C) match is not the outcome
observed most frequently in the data. Indeed, in tie breaker situation that player A is the
tie breaker for sure, (B, C) match accounts for the smallest share. On the other hand, (A,
B) match, though its existence is always subject to constraints, is observed most frequently
in both tie breaker situations. The following section provides an empirical analysis to see
what factors influence individual voting decisions and voting outcomes, and to explore the
reason of the relative prevalence of (A, B) match.
9According to the condition in Proposition 13, piL(pA) ≥ γBpiL(pB)
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 How do individuals vote?
In section 2, a conditional logit model is provided to argue that players are able to update
information regarding opponents’ strengths according to their past performance. However,
the voting decisions in this regression are modeled without identifying the relative position
of a player. Strategic interaction in this voting game implies that voter in different strength
position may vote differently. Here, the voting decisions of player A, B and C are estimated
by three binary probit regressions. For each regression, the voter’s probability of voting
against the stronger candidate in episodes k, e.g. player A voting against player B, is given
by the following equation:
Prk(A→ B) = Φ(xkβ′) (10)
where xk is a vector of explanatory variables and Φ(·) in the estimated equation is given
by cumulative probability function of Gauss distribution. xk includes six binary variables
indicating the tie breaker identity situations, six binary variables indicating the revenge
motive originated from voting history in previous rounds, six variables on performance
indices of three players interacted with the two major tie breaker identity situations, and
a set of variables controlling for possible discrimination effect. It also includes a binary
variable indicating whether the stronger candidate is also the one who scores the single
minimum correct rate in the voting round, controlling for possible framing effect. A revenge
motive of player i against player j is also controlled for by including a dummy variable
which takes one if, in one of three previous rounds, player j has voted against player i at
least once. In addition, the revenge motives of candidate against voter and revenge motives
between candidates are considered. In the two major tie breaker situations discussed in the
theoretical section, the effects of performance index on voting are estimated. This is done
by multiplying performance indices of the three players with the dummy variable indication
tie breaker situations. Six variables are hence yielded. Due to small sub-sample size, for
example only about ten observations are available for other tie breaker situations, the effects
of performance indices in other tie breaker situations are omitted. Summary description on
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explanatory variables is provided in Table 5. And estimated results for player A, player B
and player C are presented in Table 6.
For player A, B and C, the revenge motives to vote against the stronger candidate are
all positive and significant at 5% level of significance. If Player A has a revenge motive
against player B, the probability of player A voting against player B increases by 43.5%
(evaluated at the sample means of explanatory variables). The corresponding estimates
for player B to vote against player A, and for player C to vote against player A are 37%
and 36.8% respectively. The results justify the assumption that a considerable proportion of
players are vengeful in tie breaking. Moreover, coefficients indicating revenge motive against
stronger candidate have high significant level than those against weak candidate. It seems
that revenge motive is affected by the strength of target, justifying the assumption that the
proportion of vengeful tie breaker depends on the strength ratio of two candidates due to
its association with revenge cost.
A remarkable feature suggested by the probit models is that voting behavior is some-
how inertial. A player i who has voted against player j before is likely to vote against
player j again. For example, in the regression for player A, the revenge motive of player B
against player A indicates that player A has voted against player B before. This variable
being positive and significant means that the probability of player A voting against player
B increases if player A has done so previously. Similar observation can be found in the
regressions for player B and player C. If player B has voted against player A, s/he is likely
to vote against player A again. If player C has voted against player B before, s/he is likely
to vote against player B again. Such inertia in voting choice may reflect personal preference
on unobserved characteristics such as appearance and manner, or it reflects some private
signals received by individual regarding to strength of a particular opponent. These private
signals, for example being confident, may cast one’s belief of a candidate being strong in
spite of statistical performance.
Being the unique possible tie breaker significantly increase player B and player C’s prob-
ability to vote against player A. This suggests that the tie breaker identity is crucial in the
voting. Players are capable to consider the voting as a two stage game, in contrast with the
presumption in Fe´vriera and Linnemerb (2006) that tie breaker randomizes in a tie, which
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essentially reduces it into a one-shot game.
When tie breaker is player A for sure, only the performance index of player A has a
statistically significant impact on player C’s voting decision. As expected, the higher is the
performance index of player A, the more likely player C would vote against player A. To
voting off player A, it requires both player B and C to vote against player A. It is risky in
the sense that failure of coordination may result elimination by vengeful tie breaker. High
performance index of player A is associated with a larger payoff difference between matching
with player A and with player B. Thus, ceteris paribus, higher performance index of player
A attracts player C’s incline for (B, C) match outcome.
When tie breaker is player A or player B with equal chance, higher performance index
of player C significant increase the chance of player A voting against player B. However,
the asymmetric information model suggests the opposite. For (A, B) match to exist, (α −
1
2
)(2pA+2pB−3pC) ≤ 12 needs to be satisfied. Higher strength of player C is in favor of this
condition and hence reduces the chance for player A to vote against player B. For (A, C)
match to exist, one needs piL(pA) ≥ γBpiL(pB). If the assumption that γB is a non-increasing
function of pA/pC holds, γB increase as pC . (A, C) match is harder to hold and player A is
less likely to vote against player B. In either case, the probability of player A voting against
player B decrease as strength of player C increases. Of course, analysis above is static.
Existence conditions may not be binding. And changes in strengths of players may also
affect the coordination and choice of equilibrium. The following section explores strengths
and other factors’ influence on the voting outcomes.
4.2 What affects voting outcome?
To examine what factors affect the voting outcomes, this study uses a multinomial logit
model. The probability that the voting outcome in episodes k is j is given by
Prob(Yk = j) =
exp(xkβj)∑3
l=1 exp(xkβl)
(11)
where j = 1, 2, 3 indicate (A, B), (A, C) and (B,C) match respectively. xk is a vector of
variables describing a voting game. In this model, the three players in one game are treated
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as an agent making collective decision over the possible voting outcomes. The interested
subset of explanatory variables is the same as those used in the binary probit models, but
the set of control variables are changed. The control variables now include distribution of
gender, occupation and race to control for the possible discrimination. Details are presented
in Table 7. Since underlying justification of multinomial logit model is the random utility,
the associated indeterminacy is to be solved by artificially setting a base outcome, so that
the predicted probabilities of other outcomes are compared to the base outcome. Given that
(B, C) match is the voting outcome universally exist, it is chosen as base outcome.
Player B being tie breaker for sure significantly reduces the probability of observing (A,
C) match, and player C being tie breaker significantly reduces the probability of observing
(A, B) match, both compared to (B, C) match. Also, when tie breaker is player A for sure,
it increases the probability of (A, C) match compared to (B, C) match. That is, being a
tie breaker for sure significantly lowers one’s probability of being eliminated. The marginal
effect for player B and player C around mean values of explanatory variables are more than
30%, which is too high to be explained solely by the advantage of survival for the tie breaker
after a tie happens. This confirms the fact that tie breaker identity is crucial in the strategic
voting.
Historical revenge motive remains significant. A revenge motive between player A and
player B in either direction has a negative marginal effect greater than 40% on observing
(A, B) match. The probability of (B, C) match is lower if a revenge motive of player B
against player C presents. A revenge motive of player C against player B also has a positive
impact on (A, C) match and a negative impact on (A, B) match, when marginal effects on
observing these matching outcomes are evaluated around sample means.
When player A is tie breaker for sure, the coefficient of performance index of play A is
negative and significant. An increment of 0.15 in performance index of player A, which is
close to the mean strength difference between player A and player B is roughly associated
with a 0.25 decrease in the probability of (A, C) match in related to (B, C) match. This is in
line with the implication in the asymmetric information model. Outstanding performance
of player A makes the existent condition of the equilibrium supporting both (A, C) match
and (A, B) match more restrictive. Also, it is intuitive that, given strength of player B
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and player C, higher strength of player A provides large incentive for player B and C to
coordinate to eliminate player A.
When player A or player B can both be tie breaker, it is striking that, the marginal
effects of three strength variables on observing (A, C) match are all significant with a
large magnitude. In contrast with situation in which player A is tie breaker for sure, the
probability of observing (A, C) match now increases as strength of player A. Moreover,
performance index of player B has a negative marginal effect, and performance index of
player C has a positive marginal effect, both on the probability of observing (A, C) match.
Only the marginal effect of strength of player C (on observing (A, C) match) is in the same
direction as in the symmetric information model with revenge motive. For strategy profile
supporting (A, C) match to survive dominant eliminations, (α− 1
2
)(2pA−pB−pC) < 12 needs
to be satisfied. If this condition is binding, weakness of player A, and strength of player B and
player C increase the probability of (A, C) match. In the asymmetric information model, the
pooling equilibrium supporting (A, C) match requires piL(pA) ≥ γBpiL(pB). Higher strength
of player A lowers the LHS of above inequality. Though it potentially lowers γB as well,
one might expect that the linear decrease in the LHS utility dominates the indirect decrease
through γB on the RHS. So it is more likely that probability of observing (A, C) match
decreases as strength of player A increase. High strength of player B lowers the RHS and
hence is in favor of (A, C) match’s existence. Through its possible affect on γB, higher
strength of player C may increase the RHS of above inequality and constrain the existence
for this equilibrium. In sum, the two models agree that strength of player A should have
a negative marginal effect on observing (A, C) match, which is rejected by the regression
results. Neither model could give implication correctly on more than one strength variable.
For (A, B) match, the symmetric information model with revenge motive suggests that
marginal effects of strength of player B and player C on observing (A, B) match should be
positive, and marginal effect of player A should be negative. In the asymmetric information
model, the marginal effects are negative for the strength of player A and player B, and are
positive for player C. The two models agree on the negative effect of player A’s strength and
positive effect on player C’s strength. However, the coefficient of pA is significantly positive,
though the significance is gone when marginal effect around sample mean is calculated.
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Also, the marginal effect of player C’s strength is negative and significant. Both estimates
are not in line with theoretical implications.
The poor predictability of theoretical models when tie breaker is uncertain suggests
that distribution of strength as an instrument for coordination plays a significant role in
voting. The increased strategic uncertainty induces players to be more keen to coordinate to
eliminate a particular opponent before tie happens, and less concerned about the associated
payoff difference in different matches. Successful coordination secures one’s proceeding in the
game and hence a minimum expected payoff. Given the implicit suggestion in the TV show’s
name, the successful coordination on eliminating weakest contestants in previous round,
and the show’s pitiless highlight on eliminated contestants in each round, the strength of
players is a natural focus point for such coordination. Indeed, the regression result suggests
that, when tie breaker could be player A or player B, higher past performance lowers one’s
chance to be eliminated, which does not exhibit when tie breaker is player A for sure. The
coordination effect dominates the existent condition effects in equilibrium analysis.
4.3 Strategic pretence
In the simplest situation where player A is tie breaker for sure, and information regarding
strengths is symmetric, player A will always be eliminated. Through out the theoretical
analysis, equilibrium eliminating player C to have (A, B) match requires more restrictive
condition and is less straight forward to be constructed. Even without any background in
game theory, it is not difficult for contestants to have a prior that strong contestant would
be considered as a threat and more tend to be voted off. It thus creates incentive for a player
to intentionally give incorrect attempt even if one knew the answer. Then, a question would
be whether and to what extent such strategic pretence exists and, if exists, how it affects
voting. Table 9 shows the correct rates in each round of players who survive all voting. As
shown, the average correct rates of player A and player B across the sample experience a
mild decrease from Round 3 to Round 4. While contemporary decrease for player C is much
more dramatic. However, when it comes to Round 5, the average correct rates of player A
and player B continue to decline. But there is a significant raise for the correct rate of player
C. Since there is no elimination in Round 5, contestants should have clear incentive to give
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correct answers for prize accumulation. It suggests that player C is likely to pretend weak
strategically. Given that the correct rates are averaged over those who survive all voting,
it should not be due to selection bias from the voting result of Round 4 that strong player
A and/or player B have been eliminated10 It suggest. Moreover, the drop in correct rate is
significant for player A but mild for player B. If it reflects a significant increase in question
difficulty, it implies that player A has little strategic pretending but there could be some for
player B, though the proportion should be much small than player C.
Figure 1 illustrates a non-parametric regression of wining probability of the stronger
candidate over the weaker one, on the difference of performance index they have as in Round
4. One would expect that the wining probability is an increasing function of such strength
gap and the probability being winner for the stronger contestant in a survived match is
on average greater than 50%. However, the monotonic increase does not happen until the
strength gap exceeds a certain value. Below such value, the stronger contestant could have
winning chance less than a fair toss. Table 10 summarizes the performance index difference
of the survived contestants as in Round 4, and the winning chance of the stronger contestant
estimated by the sample mean. The performance index of player A in (A, B) match and (A,
C) match are very close, while performance index gap is .1725785 on average between player
A and player B, and .244332 on average for player A and player C. However, the probability
of player A wining over player C is just slightly higher than that of player A winning over
player B. The hypothesis that the winning chances of player A in these two matches are
equal can not be rejected at any conventional level of significance. On the other hand, when
player B head-to-heads against player C, who potentially can be very strong, s/he still has
about 64% chance on average to win. Combining the non-parametric regression and the
head-to-head outcome, it can be concluded that extent the strategic pretence of player C is
moderate, i.e. strategic pretence only spans a narrow interval of real strength. It is rare that
player C, who is identified as the weakest player according to past performance, actually
turns out to be strongest player.
10A Heckman Selection model was also estimated. Correct rates of player A and player B in Round
5 significantly decreased, compared to their correct rates in all previous rounds. But there is insufficient
evidence of such decrease for player C. The Heckman Selection model confirmed that this observation was
not due to sample selection in the last voting.
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When strategic pretence of player C and probably of player B exists, the past performance
as a signal of strength for comparing real strength of player B and player C is invalid. It
justifies the insensitivity of player A in respond to the strengths of player B and player C
when s/he is tie breaker for sure. In this situation, though higher strengths of player B
and player C increase their chances being voted against by player A in the probit model,
the coefficient is nevertheless insignificant. It also provides an explanation why as large as
58% of time player A, being the tie breaking for sure, votes against player C, which is a
dominated strategic if player A acts as if strength information is symmetric. However, on the
ground that weak contestants are not able to pretend strong, the performance index of player
A provides a signal of one’s lower bound of strength. Therefore, though the possibility of
strategic pretence is open, outstanding performance record of player A still increases his/her
odds of being voted off.
5 Conclusion
The paper assessed the three-person strategic voting in TV game shows The Weakest Link.
It is found that, when the game form is relatively simple, i.e. tie breaker identity is clear,
basic game theory analysis fits the empirical observations quite well. When the tie breaker
identity is unsure, actual voting behavior deviates from theoretical prediction. It is argued
that coordinating behavior has a dominant effect. It suggests that strategic uncertainty,
payoff uncertainty and game form complexity could significantly reduce predictability of
game theory on actual strategic behavior. Strategic pretence is also found as a source
partially invalidating public signals, which is also attributed for inaccurate predictability of
theoretical analysis. Revenge motive is found to be significant in voting, suggesting players
do not always maximize monetary payoff.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: If pB > pC , in case of tie, player A will always choose to go with
player C. When both player B and player C vote against player A, player A is directly
eliminated, player A’s vote is immaterial. In other cases, voting against player B will ensure
player A to go with player C in the head-to-head. However, voting against player C in some
case leads player A to be matched with player B in head-to-head. In particular, this happens
when player B votes against player C. Therefore, it is weakly dominant for player A to vote
against player B. Given that player A will vote against player B and will eliminate player B
in a tie, player B can only stay in the game and get positive expected utility when player
C votes against A. This requires player B to vote against player A as well. Finally, when
player A and player B vote against each other, it is optimal for player C to vote off player
A.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Since player C will not be eliminated in any tie, and matching
with player A is strictly worse off for player C than matching with player B, voting against
player A weakly dominates voting against player B. Then, it is optimal for player B to vote
against A. As a result, (B, C) match forms and player A is indifferent between voting either.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Given that player A is vengeful, it is still weakly dominated for
player A to vote against player B. To see this, when player B and player C vote against each
other, voting against player A results (A, C) match, giving player A strictly higher expected
payoff than in (A, B) match if s/he votes against player C. In other strategy profile of
player B and player C, player A’s vote does not affect the voting outcome. Player A will be
always matched to player B if player B votes against C, and player C votes against A, since
player A’s vote either eliminates player C or induces a tie, in which eventually player C is
eliminated. The analogue argument applies to the strategy profile in which player B votes
against A, and player C votes against player B. When player B and player C both votes
against player A, player A will be voted off regardless. Given player A will vote against B,
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it is weakly dominant for player B to vote against player A. This is because, when player C
votes against player A, voting against A matches player B to player C, while voting against
player C induces a tie and match player B to player A. When player C votes against player
B, player B will be voted off directly and player B’s vote will be insignificant. Given player
A and player B votes against each other, it is optimal for player C to votes against player
A. Therefore, player A is eliminated.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: If piC(pB) ≥ 2piC(pA) holds, it is weakly dominant for player C
to vote against player A. Then, it is strictly dominant for player B to vote against player A.
Thus, player A will be eliminated.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: If piC(pB) < 2piC(pA), no player has weakly dominated strategy.
(B, C) match is supported by the strategy profile that both player B and player C vote
against player A, and player A votes against either. It is optimal for player B and player C
to match with each other, and player A’ vote does not change the voting outcome. (B, C)
match is Nash equilibrium.
(A, C) match is supported by the strategy profile that both player A and player C vote
against player B, player B votes against player C. Now it is optimal for player A to match
with player C in the head-to-head, and player B’s unilateral deviation does not affect the
voting outcomes. Player C’s equilibrium expected utility is piC(pA). If Player C deviates
to vote against player A, there will be a tie. With probability 1/2, player A will be tie
breaker and will eliminate player C vengefully. With probability 1/2, player B will be tie
breaker and choose to go with player C. Thus, the expected utility of deviation for player
C is piC(pB)/2. Therefore, given inequality (7), it is not profitable to deviate.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: (A, B) match is supported by the strategy profile that both player
A and player B vote against player C, player C votes against player A with probability qC ,
and with (1 − qC) against player B. If player A deviates, with probability (1 − qC) s/he is
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matched with player C; With probability q, deviation of player A induces a tie and player
A will be eliminated when the tie breaker turns out to be player B. When the tie breaker
turns out to be player A, player A chooses player B to go with due to the revenge motive
against player C. Thus, for player A not to deviate, it requires
piA(pB) ≥ (1− qC)piA(pC) + 1
2
qCpiA(pB) (12)
Similarly, for player B to not deviate, it requires
piB(pA) ≥ qCpiB(pC) + 1
2
(1− qC)piB(pA) (13)
These two equations are reduced to:
piA(pC)− piA(pB)
piA(pC)− 12piA(pB)
≤ qC ≤ piB(pC)− piB(pA)
piB(pC)− 12piB(pA)
(14)
Since piA(pC)−piA(pB)
piA(pC)− 12piA(pB)
> 0 and piB(pC)−piB(pA)
piB(pC)− 12piB(pA)
< 1, there exists q ∈ (0, 1) if and only if
piA(pC)− piA(pB)
piA(pC)− 12piA(pB)
≤ piB(pC)− piB(pA)
piB(pC)− 12piB(pA)
(15)
⇔ piA(pC)piB(pA) ≤ piA(pB)piB(pC) (16)
By the definition of pii, the above inequality always holds. Thus, (A, B) match can be
supported by mixed strategy equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 7: Firstly, no player has dominant strategy when the two types of
players, H and L, can vote differently. The pooling sequential equilibrium giving (A, C)
match has the strategy profiles that, regardless types, both player A and player C vote
against player B, and player B votes against player C. The off-equilibrium belief of player
A is unconstrained. In this equilibrium, player A gets expected utility piH(pC) or piL(pC),
depending on his/her strength type. Player A’s deviation will match player A with B, giving
player A expected utility piH(pB) or piL(pB), which is lower for both strength types of player
A. Unilateral deviation for player B does not change the voting outcome, player B remains
to be voted off and get zero utility. Player C’s deviation would induce a tie. Since tie breaker
is player A for sure, player C will be matched to player A, with probability pA being High
type, or be eliminated. There is no chance player C can be matched to player B given this
equilibrium strategy profile. Thus, player C does not have profitable deviation.
The pooling equilibrium supporting (B, C) match is that, both types of player B and
player C vote against player A, and player A votes against player B or player C. Player A
will be eliminated regardless how s/he votes, so there is no profitable deviation for player
A. Suppose player A votes against player B, player C’s deviation will immediately elimi-
nate player B. This leaves player C matched with player A in the head-to-head, instead of
with player B, which is worse off for player C. For player B, the deviation induces a tie.
Matching with the tie breaker, player A, gives player B at most piH(pA) or piL(pA) (achieved
if tie breaker always eliminates player C). Therefore, no one has profitable deviation. The
argument is analogous when player A votes against player C.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: Firstly, (A, B) match can not be a result after tie in equilibrium.
Whoever is eliminated in the tie can just switch her/his vote to ensure his/her survival in
the game and yields positive expected payoff. At least one type in each of player A and
player B must vote against player C. Moreover, it can not be the case that both types of
player B vote against the same candidate. If both types of player B vote against player
A, it is optimal for player C to do so as well. If both types of player B to vote against
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player C, voting against player B ensures player A at least piT (pC), instead of piT (pB) if s/he
votes against player C. Thus, to have a pure strategy equilibrium supporting (A, B) match,
different types of player B must vote differently. Also, it can not be the case that both type
of player C vote against player A. Otherwise, it is optimal for player B to vote against player
A and there is no (A, B) match.
Therefore, there are six strategy profiles of player B and player C left. In the strategy
profile that High type player B and player C vote against player A, while Low types vote
against each other, player A is indifferent between voting against either. However, this can
not be an equilibrium since no matter how player A vote. High type of player B and player
C can only survive when they are matched with each other. No matter how player A votes,
at least one High type of player B or player C can gain by deviating to mimic his/her Low
type. The two strategy profiles with which it is optimal for player A to vote against player C
are not Nash equilibrium as well. In both strategy profiles, High type player B vote against
player A while Low type votes against player C. In the strategy profile that both types of
player C votes against player B, High type player B is always eliminated but Low type is
not. So s/he will deviate. In the strategy profile that High type player C votes against
player B while Low type votes against player A, it is strictly better off for High type player
C to deviate11. In sum, there is no pure strategy equilibrium supporting (A, B) match.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: Again dominant strategy does not exist in asymmetric informa-
tion situation. The equilibrium supporting (A, C) match is that both types of player A and
player C vote against player B, and both types of player B vote against player C. If player
C deviate to induce a tie, the off-equilibrium belief of the tie breaker is that the deviating
player C is of High type while the other candidate’s probability of being High type is as
prior belief (strength signal). So player C will be eliminated in a tie and would not deviate.
This off-equilibrium belief can be supported by the following complete mixed strategy. Let
the probability High type player C assigns to vote against player A be given by sequence
{σCHi}, the probability Low type player C assigns to vote against player A be given by
11Assume that the tie breaker randomizes when both candidates in a tie have the same type according to
Bayesian update
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sequence {σCLi}. They are positive and converge to zero. Let σCLi = σ2CHi, when both σCLi
and σCHi converge to zero, the Bayesian update on the probability of deviating C being
High type, when player C’s strategy converge to equilibrium strategy is
lim
σCHi→0
pCσCHi
pCσCHi + (1− pC)σ2CHi
= 1 (17)
It is easy to see that player A and player B do not have profitable deviation as well.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: Similar to proof of Proposition 6. The two types of each player
vote in the same way as in the equilibrium in Proposition 6 The off-equilibrium belief on
candidate strength is the same as the prior belief.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11: The pooling sequential equilibrium giving (A, C) match has the
strategy profiles that, regardless types, both player A and player C vote against player B,
and player B votes against player C. The off-equilibrium belief of (Non-vengeful) player A is
unconstrained. The proof is essentially the same as in Proposition 7, except that only non-
vengeful player A has off-equilibrium belief. Non-vengeful player A will eliminate player C if
player C deviates and induces a tie. As in the proof of Proposition 7, deviation makes player
A worse off, for both tie-breaker types. Player B’s deviation changes nothing. Given the
existence of Vengeful tie breaker, deviating player C, who induces a tie, will be eliminated
with some positive probability. Without player B’s vote against player A, there is no chance
for player C to match with player B, who is weaker than player A. Thus, deviation leads
player C strictly worse off.
The pooling equilibrium supporting (B, C) match is similar to the one in Proposition 7.
All type of player A, including strength type and vengeful-non-vengeful types, vote in the
same way, either against player B or against player C. Both player B and player C of both
types vote against player A. The proof is almost identical except that the deviating player
who creates a tie will be eliminated by vengeful player A, and becomes worse off.
Q.E.D.
32
Proof of Proposition 12: In this equilibrium, non-vengeful player A will always go with
player C. Deviating to vote against player C will match him/her with player B and becomes
worse off. Vengeful player A is always match with player B, yielding expected utility piT (pB),
T = H,L depending on player A’s strength type. If Vengeful player A deviates to vote
against B, with probability pC , s/he will go with High type player C; with probability
(1− pC), player C votes against player A and there is a tie A→ B → C → A. The vengeful
nature will dictate player A to eliminate player C, even if player C is of Low type in this
tie. The deviating expected utility will be pCpiT (1) + (1 − pC)piT (pB). As piT (1) < piT (pB),
deviating makes Vengeful player strictly worse off, for both High and Low type. For player C,
s/he stays if and only if player A is non-vengeful, who will vote against player B, regardless
whether player C votes against player A or B. Hence, it is indifferent for both type of
player C to vote against either. For player B, the equilibrium utility is γApiL(pA). If s/he
deviates, s/he can be stay only when player C votes against A. In other case, i.e. player
C votes against B, s/he is either directly voted off when player A is non-vengeful or voted
off after a tie when player A is Vengeful. Given Low type player C votes against player A,
γApiL(pA) ≥ (1 − pC)piL(0) prevents Low type player C to deviate. As piL(pA) < piL(0), γA
must be greater than (1− pC). Given piH(x) = piL(x) + (α− 12), γApiL(pA) ≥ (1− pC)piL(0)
implies
γA(piL(pA) + α− 1
2
) ≥ (1− pC)(piL(0) + α− 1
2
)
i.e. γApiH(pA) ≥ (1− pC)piH(0), High type player B will not deviate as well.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 13: (B, C) match is supported by the following strategy profile:
both types of player B and player C vote against player A, all types of player A, including
tie breaker types and strength types, votes against the same candidate, either player B or
player C. Given that player B and player C both vote against A, deviating player B or player
C will either match with player A or induce a tie. In either case, the deviating player (B or
C) gets expected utility strictly lower than piT (pA), T = H,L, as with positive probability
they will be eliminated or positive probability of matching with player A. This does not
depend on the off equilibrium belief.
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(A, C) match can be supported by pooling equilibrium that all player A and C vote
against player B, both types of player B vote against player C. The associated off equilibrium
belief is that the deviating player C, who will induce tie A→ B → C → A, is of High type.
The off-equilibrium belief can be supported by the complete mixed strategy sequence as in
proof of Proposition 9. Given this belief, the deviating player C will not be eliminated only
when the tie breaker is player B and s/he is of Vengeful type. So the non-deviating condition
for player C is:
piL(pA) ≥ γBpiL(pB) (18)
Since piH(pA) = piL(pA) +α− 12 , and γB < 1, the non-deviating condition for High type C is
automatically satisfied once the above non-deviating condition for Low type holds. Finally,
player A and player B’s deviation is not profitable. Thus, one has equilibrium gives (A, C)
match.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 14: The off equilibrium associated with this sequential equilibrium
is that the deviating player A or player B is believed to have strength as the prior by
the other potential tie breaker, which can be supported by the complete mixed strategy
sequence that both types of a player vote exactly the same. So that deviating player A will
be eliminated when the tie breaker turns out to be player B, and vise versus, given that in
either case player C is believed to be of strength pC .
Let both types of player C vote against player A with probability qC . The non-deviating
conditions for player A and player B with non-vengeful Low type are
piL(pB) ≥ (1− qC)piL(pC) + 1
2
qCpiL(pC) (19)
piL(pA) ≥ qCpiL(pC) + 1
2
(1− qC)piL(pC)
If the non-deviating conditions for non-vengeful players are satisfied, non-deviating condi-
tions for Vengeful players below are automatically satisfied
piL(pB) ≥ (1− qC)piL(pC) + 1
2
qCpiL(pB) (21)
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piL(pA) ≥ qCpiL(pC) + 1
2
(1− qC)piL(pA) (22)
For the same argument as in proof of Proposition 8, the non-deviating conditions of Low
type implies the non-deviating conditions of High type. The non-deviating conditions for
Low type player A and player B can be reduced to
2[piL(pC)− piL(pB)]
piL(pC)
≤ qC ≤ 2piL(pA)− piL(pC)
piL(pC)
(23)
qC ∈ (0, 1) exists if and only if:
2[piL(pC)− piL(pB)] ≤ 2piL(pA)− piL(pC) (24)
⇔ (α− 1
2
)(2pA + 2pB − 3pC) ≤ 1
2
(25)
Q.E.D.
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Table 1: Probability of a candidate being voted against a b
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
β, (S.E.) β, (S.E.) β, (S.E.) β, (S.E.)
percentc -2.840*** -2.105*** -1.960*** -0.778***
(0.144) (0.159) (0.204) (0.247)
percentclag1 - -0.769*** -0.494*** -0.324
- (0.176) (0.191) (0.268)
percentclag2 - - -0.496** -0.488*
- - (0.218) (0.287)
percentclag3 - - - -0.231
- - - (0.291)
age 0.012** 0.009* 0.011 0.024**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
black 0.153 -0.110 -0.504** -0.530*
(0.147) (0.193) (0.232) (0.280)
otherrace -0.026 0.334 0.260 -0.826*
(0.254) (0.276) (0.322) (0.494)
fat -0.001 0.163 0.005 0.206
(0.148) (0.162) (0.206) (0.266)
college -0.014 -0.478*** 0.068 0.133
(0.111) (0.123) (0.150) (0.205)
doctorate -0.564 -1.386*** -1.199*** 0.196
(0.392) (0.455) (0.462) (0.517)
uncertainedu -0.135 -0.212 0.116 0.380
(0.286) (0.292) (0.319) (0.422)
profedu 0.166 -0.090 0.054 -0.132
(0.196) (0.210) (0.276) (0.383)
stillsch 0.369* -0.210 0.574* 0.154
(0.207) (0.267) (0.307) (0.439)
samefemale -0.399*** -0.363*** -0.158 -0.493**
(0.119) (0.128) (0.142) (0.203)
samemale -0.152 -0.218* -0.520*** 0.023
(0.116) (0.129) (0.167) (0.207)
samerace 0.019 -0.189 -0.429* -0.607**
(0.146) (0.194) (0.230) (0.276)
sameBcollar -0.205 0.086 0.572 0.124
(0.300) (0.301) (0.402) (0.478)
sameprof -0.022 0.218 -0.332 -0.667**
(0.163) (0.185) (0.208) (0.320)
sameedu -0.013 -0.002 -0.135 0.271
(0.114) (0.124) (0.155) (0.208)
Pseudo R2 0.200 0.144 0.131 0.068
Log-likelihood -1049.014 -807.127 -517.620 -262.852
χ2 525.355 271.105 155.656 38.519
Number of cases 4075 2720 1626 814
aβ’s give the point estimates of coefficients. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are included in the
parentheses
bSee Table 11 for explanation of variables
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Table 2: Summary statistics of performance index in Round 4 a
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
pfindexA 136 .7819255 .1348992 .4360146 1
pfindexB 136 .6335508 .1454915 .2766506 .9461312
pfindexC 136 .49683 .140341 .1533583 .8662421
pfindexA − pfindexB 136 .1483748 .1333252 0 .6179487
pfindexA − pfindexC 136 .2850955 .1554585 .017234 .6777432
pfindexB − pfindexC 136 .1367207 .1107028 0 .4627487
pfindexi 408 .6374354 .1821476 .1533583 1
apfindexi indiateds the performance index for Player i, i = A,B,C
Table 3: Distribution of tie breaker identity profile
A B C A or B A or C B or C A or B or C
Observations 53 18 11 29 11 4 10
Percent 39% 13% 8% 21% 8% 3% 7%
Table 4: Distribution of voting outcomes
Survived pair A & B A & C B & C
Tie breaker identity Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
A 23 43% 18 34% 12 23%
B 5 28% 6 33% 7 39%
C 4 36% 1 9% 6 55%
A or B 14 48% 6 21% 9 31%
A or C 4 36% 5 45% 2 18%
B or C 0 0% 4 100% 0 0%
A or B or C 3 30% 7 70% 0 0%
Overall 53 39% 47 35% 36 26%
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Table 6: Probability of player i voting against the stronger candidate a b c
player A player B player C
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Coeff. effect Coeff. effect Coeff. effect
β/(S.E.) β/(S.E.) β/(S.E.) β/(S.E.) β/(S.E.) β/(S.E.)
tbAsure (d) -0.196 -0.077 -2.349 -0.660** -3.961* -0.881***
(1.410) (0.548) (1.667) (0.300) (2.069) (0.170)
tbBsure (d) -0.689 -0.248 1.079* 0.410* 0.843 0.326
(0.601) (0.188) (0.620) (0.215) (0.802) (0.296)
tbCsure (d) -1.241* -0.379*** 0.545 0.211 3.744*** 0.742***
(0.705) (0.137) (0.795) (0.313) (1.441) (0.071)
XpfindexA -2.575 -1.014 2.587 0.948 6.785*** 2.546***
(1.739) (0.685) (1.797) (0.655) (2.315) (0.870)
XpfindexB 2.448 0.963 1.302 0.477 -2.787 -1.046
(2.363) (0.930) (2.125) (0.780) (2.702) (1.014)
XpfindexC -0.310 -0.122 -0.253 -0.093 2.042 0.766
(2.525) (0.994) (2.389) (0.876) (3.071) (1.150)
tbAB (d) -0.393 -0.150 1.578 0.569 8.488*** 0.985***
(2.626) (0.959) (2.532) (0.726) (2.999) (0.027)
tbAC (d) -1.374 -0.402*** 0.257 0.098 0.610 0.239
(0.869) (0.147) (0.684) (0.267) (0.814) (0.316)
tbBC (d) -0.182 -0.070 -0.263 -0.091 1.313 0.473
(0.900) (0.339) (1.218) (0.390) (1.521) (0.403)
rmstrongA (d) 1.192*** 0.435*** 0.965** 0.370*** 0.553 0.215
(0.427) (0.124) (0.393) (0.142) (0.423) (0.165)
rmstrongB (d) -0.019 -0.007 0.908*** 0.348*** -0.156 -0.057
(0.362) (0.142) (0.334) (0.124) (0.409) (0.147)
rmstrongC (d) -0.743* -0.265** 0.116 0.043 0.959** 0.368**
(0.443) (0.135) (0.398) (0.150) (0.476) (0.170)
rmweakA (d) -0.239 -0.092 0.137 0.051 0.043 0.016
(0.448) (0.168) (0.429) (0.163) (0.520) (0.197)
rmweakB (d) 0.293 0.116 -0.395 -0.134 -3.250*** -0.531***
(0.397) (0.158) (0.452) (0.139) (0.978) (0.063)
rmweakC (d) 0.634* 0.249* 0.057 0.021 -0.367 -0.131
(0.356) (0.134) (0.351) (0.130) (0.400) (0.135)
tbABpfindexA -0.457 -0.180 -0.523 -0.192 -10.313** -3.870**
(3.509) (1.381) (3.414) (1.251) (4.592) (1.692)
tbABpfindexB -4.258 -1.676 -2.914 -1.068 3.234 1.213
(3.153) (1.243) (2.920) (1.070) (3.537) (1.320)
tbABpfindexC 5.795* 2.281* 2.345 0.860 -2.660 -0.998
(3.130) (1.232) (3.020) (1.107) (3.052) (1.144)
Pseudo R2 0.262 0.262 0.216 0.216 0.411 0.411
Log-likelihood -69.017 -69.017 -70.154 -70.154 -54.958 -54.958
χ2 49.059 49.059 38.584 38.584 76.734 76.734
N 136.000 136.000 136.000 136.000 136.000 136.000
aβ’s give the point estimates of coefficients or marginal effects. Standard errors of these estimates are
included in the parentheses. Marginal effects on the voting decisions are evaulated at sample means of
explantory variables.
b* indicates 10% L.O.S., ** indicates 5% L.O.S., *** indicates 1% L.O.S.
c(d) indicates that marginal effect is calculated for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Table 8: Multinomial Logit Model - Probability of matching outcomes a b c
(A, B) match (A, C) match
Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect
tbAsure (d) 5.978 0.311 6.881* 0.464
(3.788) (0.539) (4.066) (0.511)
tbBsure (d) -2.386* -0.271 -3.707*** -0.327***
(1.241) (0.183) (1.261) (0.083)
tbCsure (d) -2.749** -0.328** -4.379*** -0.332***
(1.361) (0.162) (1.653) (0.077)
tbAB (d) -10.749** -0.167 -20.088** -0.823***
(5.218) (0.222) (8.456) (0.231)
XpfindexA -6.584 0.083 -12.188** -1.666**
(4.427) (0.791) (5.036) (0.798)
XpfindexB -3.290 -0.411 -2.881 -0.149
(4.189) (0.956) (5.428) (1.019)
XpfindexC 0.752 -0.688 6.208 1.215
(4.545) (1.010) (5.443) (1.006)
rmstrongA (d) -2.477** -0.424*** -0.491 0.139
(1.006) (0.105) (0.928) (0.187)
rmstrongB (d) -2.462*** -0.452*** -0.257 0.205
(0.930) (0.104) (0.837) (0.172)
rmweakA (d) 0.255 0.057 0.044 -0.027
(0.892) (0.198) (1.173) (0.206)
rmweakB (d) 2.421** -0.091 3.567*** 0.378**
(1.230) (0.183) (1.295) (0.187)
rmweakC (d) -0.775 -0.288** 0.811 0.297*
(0.800) (0.126) (0.824) (0.156)
tbABpfindexA 15.418* 0.430 24.118** 2.960*
(8.092) (1.532) (9.856) (1.561)
tbABpfindexB 0.208 1.979 -13.680 -2.940*
(6.821) (1.530) (9.419) (1.714)
tbABpfindexC -7.226 -3.567** 12.585 3.696**
(6.484) (1.655) (10.244) (1.884)
Pseudo R2 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.336
Log-likelihood -98.062 -98.062 -98.062 -98.062
χ2 99.341 99.341 99.341 99.341
Observations 136 136 136 136
aβ’s give the point estimates of coefficients or marginal effects. Standard errors of these estimates are
included in the parentheses. Marginal effects on the voting outcomes are evaulated at sample means of
explantory variables.
b* indicates 10% L.O.S., ** indicates 5% L.O.S., *** indicates 1% L.O.S.
c(d) indicates that marginal effect is calculated for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Table 9: Average correct rates of those survive all voting
A B C A, B & C
Round 1 0.88667 0.76326 0.66463 0.780443
Round 2 0.75167 0.69318 0.64228 0.698265
Round 3 0.81833 0.63636 0.59959 0.689937
Round 4 0.79833 0.61364 0.46646 0.637237
Round 5 0.67167 0.60393 0.64257 0.638069
Sample size 100 89 83 272
Table 10: Average performance index of those survive all voting
(A, C) (A, B) (B, C)
pfindexA .7837669 .7890374 .7690513
pfindexB .6532661 .6164589 .6329742
pfindexC .5394349 .4695422 .4813807
pfindexA− pfindexB .1305008 .1725785 .1360771
pfindexA− pfindexC .244332 .3194952 .2876706
pfindexB − pfindexC .1138312 .1469167 .1515935
winning .6170213 .5849057 .6388889
Observations 47 53 36
Table 11: Description of variables in Table 1
Variable Description
percentc The correct rate of answering questions in the curent voting round.
percentclag1 The correct rate of answering questions in one round before the voting round.
percentclag2 The correct rate of answering questions in two round before the voting round.
percentclag3 The correct rate of answering questions in three round before the voting round.
age Age of the candidate.
black Dummy variable, 1 if the candiate is black, 0 otherwise.
otherrace Dummy variable, 1 if the candiate is not black or white, 0 otherwise.
fat Dummy variable, 1 if the candiate is overweighted, 0 otherwise.
college Dummy variable, 1 if the candidate has college education, 0 otherwise.
doctorate Dummy variable, 1 if the candidate has a doctorate degree., 0 otherwise.
uncertainedu Dummy variable, 1 if the candidate’s education level is uncertain, 0 otherwise.
profedu Dummy variable, 1 if the candidate has a professional degree, 0 otherwise.
stillsch Dummy variable, 1 if the candidate is still in school, 0 otherwise.
samefemale Dummy variable, 1 if the voter and candidate are both female, 0 otherwise.
samemale Dummy variable, 1 if the voter and candidate are both male, 0 otherwise.
samerace Dummy variable, 1 if the voter and candidate have the same race, 0 otherwise.
sameBcollar Dummy variable, 1 if the voter and candidate are both blue collar, 0 otherwise.
sameprof Dummy variable, 1 if both voter and candidate both have professional occupation,
0 otherwise.
sameedu Dummy variable, 1 if both voter and candidate have the same education level,
0 otherwise.
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